and culture as a concern in itself. The alienation of humanity from nature is the "deepest" concern of deep ecologists. Rousseau's "natural man," while seeking only to secure his own survival, acts in a way that is generally consistent with the continued well-being of both the natural systems and the other human beings around him. He is sub ject to no law other than his inclinations and yet poses at most a very limited threat to human or nonhuman others. Thus, Rousseau dismisses the old defi nitions of "natural law," insisting that any "law" or system of right that is operable in the "state of nature" must be understood by beings in the state of nature with only the equipment that they would have in that state.
Although
The key to this system is his insistence that pitie is a natural sentiment in humans, and that this "first and simplest operation of the human soul . As we have noted above, Arne Naess's foundational distinction between the "shallow" and the "deep" environmental movements relies on the idea that the "environmental problem" is not contained in the sum of environmen tal degradation, but is essentially a crisis of the human spirit that must be addressed at the deepest levels of human identity and behavior.45 In a similar way, we can say that Rousseau's understanding of the fundamental transfor mation that amour-propre works on human beings' thought and behavior is "deep"; any reform that is likely to be effective must be one that addresses the destructive and unsustainable impulses that amour-propre awakens in us. The more sensitive the soul of the observer, the greater the ecstasy aroused in him by this harmony. At such times his senses are possessed by a deep and delightful reverie, and in a blissful self-abandonment he loses himself in the immensity of this beautiful order, with which he feels himself at one. All indi vidual objects escape him; he sees and feels nothing but the unity of things. His ideas have to be restricted and his imagination limited by some particular cir cumstances for him to observe the separate parts of this universe, which he was trying to embrace in its entirety.62
This sentiment is echoed in Gary Snyder
Like proponents of Naess's "ecosophy T," which postulates the substan tively interconnected nature of all living things, Rousseau is resolutely criti cal of an atomistic approach to the world.63 He criticizes those who "fail equally to see the whole because they have no idea of the chains of relations and combinations, which is so marvelous that it overwhelms the observer's mind.""4 Rousseau claims that his study of nature is that which is appropriate for "anyone ... who only wants to study nature in order to discover ever new reasons for loving her."65 In some cases, the transport is so palpable that he First, it is weakened because it has more competition in the human soul. We convince ourselves that the pain that we see suffered by, or inflicted upon, others is distinct from any harm to ourselves or our interests. Indeed, we often think that it might enhance our interests, and we can learn to watch things that by nature should torture us without shedding a tear. This ability to avoid feeling pitie frees us from the adherence to our natural sentiments (SD,
133).92
But Rousseau also notes that pitie is "developed" in civilized man while it is "obscure" in natural man. The "development" of this sentiment is the abil ity to "cultivate" our sense of pity and use it to form what Rousseau would call a "sensibility." This development is necessary because "compassion" or "empathy" and "natural pitie" are not the same things; the former is a trans formation of the latter. As Rousseau makes clear in his discussion of the ori gins of language in the Second Discourse, natural man, like other animals, knows only particulars. We can have pity for particulars at the very moment that we see them suffering, but a generalized sense of compassion, not to mention the intellectual act of using such a sense as the basis for a normative orientation to the world, requires both rational thought and the ability to con ceive of oneself as one being among other selves. Thus, the potentially enlarged "pitie" that we call "empathy" or "compassion" is a hybrid senti ment that is achieved by the alchemy of our natural pitie and our acquired amour-propre. This suggests that the passion by which we can feel connected in the natural world actually reinforces the distinction between the human and nonhuman self.93 Thus, the shape and extent of our compassion also proves to be quite mal 76. Compare Naess, "Self-Realization,"' 13.
77. Naess, "Self-Realization," 14.
78. Naess, "Self-Realization," 17. 
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